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ARGUMENT
POINT I
§78-34-7 U.C.A 1953 AS AMENDED IS TO
BE USED ONLY FOR DETERMINING AMOUNTS OF
FUTURE SUPPORT
Respondent's Brief (Page 3) conceeds that a father
in the State of Utah has an absolute duty to support his wife
and children, and that a prior court order of support is not a
prerequisite to seeking either a prospective support order, or an
order directing reimbursement for support already provided.
Respondents Digitized
then byturn
around and argue on Page 4 that "under the
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UCLSA, the determination of both prospective and retroactive
support liability must be made by the District Court pursuant
to the criteria set out in §78-45-7 U.C.A."
§78-45-7 U.C.A. pertains to hearings to determine
prospective support only and does not apply to reimbursement.
The seven factors named for consideration are all prospective
in nature.

That is, each factor should be considered independently

and with the others in determining an amount to be paid in the
future.

Thus, U.C.A. §78-45-7 should be applied only in hearings

for prospective support.

The standard reimbursement set out in

§78-45-9 U.C.A. should be used in cases of recovery for past
support, (Discussion:

Point III, Appellant's Brief).

Much of Respondent's brief involves arguments that an
obligor's liability for past support should be based upon his
actual current ability to provide. Appellant, primarily concerned

|

with reimbursement for prior support when the State of Utah is
forced to assume the obligation, takes issue with Respondent's
position.

Thus, much of the language and case citation throughout

f

Respondents' brief attempting to distinguish between duty and
liability of support, is simply inapplicable to the basic issue
of retroactive reimbursement for support rendered under §78-45-9,
U.C.A.

4

The obvious injustice of following Respondent's argument

is the following hypothetical.

A defendant earns $1,500.00 a month

for three years of a separation with no divorce.
hearing he is unemployed.

At the time of

To say, that the defendant's liability

for back support
is based on his unemployment is indeed a miscarriage
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of justice.

Reimbursement means reimbursement. Respondents1

arguments tend to obscure the issue before the court.
POINT II
UNDER THE UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
SUPPORT ACT, SUPPORT LIABILITY IS
DETERMINED BY THE SUPPORT LAW OF EACH
STATE
Respondents and Appellants both recognize that under
UCLSA, support liability is determined by the support law of
each state.

On Page 8 of their brief, Respondents quote from

the Commissioner's Prefatory Note to the UCLSA, Uniform Laws
Annotated, Master Edition, Vol 9 at pg. 133:
"Under these sections then the
by the destitute obligee is to be
by the duty of support set out in
of the state where the obligor is

recovery
measured
the law
present "

Appellants submit that Utah law on duty of support, under
§78-45-3 U.C.A., does not measure the amount of recovery.

Rather,

it provides in §78-45-7 criteria to determine prospective support
owed by an obligor, and in §78-45-9, a means to recover past
support supplied by the state, in an action for reimbursement
against an obligor who has failed in his statutory duty to
support his family.

This is the state law referred to in the above

quoted section.
On Page 10 of Respondent's brief, they argue that:
"Under Utah law, there need not be a prior
court order of support for a court to conduct
a hearing to determine liability for support
already provided."
Of course there need not be a prior court order of support for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

a court to conduct a Machine-generated
hearing to
OCR,determine
may contain errors. liability for support

already provided.

First of all, had there already been a

court order, the amount of liability would have already been set,
and another hearing would be unnecessary.

But, more importantly,
i

the issue of duty and liability of support is determined
statutorily under.the UCLSA, and thus no such hearing is required.
Rather, the obligor is under a statutory duty to support his
1
obligees, §78-45-3, and when he fails to do so, his amount of
liability has already been set statutorily under §78-4 5-9 for
support already provided.

That liability is reimbursement.

His future liability for support is statutorily set by §78-45-7,
and is judicially determined in a hearing.

Thus, the only

purpose for a hearing under §78-45-9 is to get a judgment rendered
against the obligor to reimburse the state, and §78-4 5-7 does
not apply in reimbursement cases.
On Page 9 of their brief, Respondents cite emotionally
inflamatory language from Brocklebanky s Interstate Enforcement of
Family Support 2nd Ed. 1971.

"This becomes at times a sort of

sadistic cry, 'Lets soak the fleeing puppy.'
unworthy objective.

But this is an

No law should ever 'soak' anybody."

First

of all, Appellants would like to point that Brocklebankfs book
is a treatise on the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,

^

not on the UCLSA which is the subject of the instant litigation.
The UCLSA was enacted to statutorily establish duties of support,
not to "soak" runaway obligors.

Surely Respondents imply by

quoting such language that because the State of Utah merely seeks
reimbursement from obligors for support given to needy obligees,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that the UCLSA is a law designed to "soak" such obligor.

If

anything, it would appear that delinquent obligors are "soaking"
the taxpayers of the State of Utah.

To the contrary of

Respondent's implications, §78-45-9 is intended to protect the
rights of helpless obligees in the State of Utah, who without
such legal recourse, would be subject to no hope of support, save
from the state.

Likewise, the State of Utah can hardly be said to

be "soaking" an obligor when it forces such an individual to face
up to his legal and moral support obligations.
POINT III
THE UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT
ACT WAS ENACTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING
SUPPORT FOR NEEDY OBLIGEES, AND, FOR PROVIDING
THE STATE OF UTAH, ACTING AS A THIRD PARTY,
WITH A RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR NECESSARIES
FURNISHED.
Point III of Respondent's brief, Page 11, contains
the following argument that the UCLSA was:
"... enacted for the purpose of obtaining
support for needy obligees, not for
providing the State of Utah, acting as a
third party, with a right to reimburesment..."
This interpretation of the statute totally disregards the
language of it. The UCLSA was enacted for the purpose of obtaining
support for needy obligees from the obligors who have a duty to
support, thereby relieving the State of Utah of the burden of
support.

Furthermore, §78-45-9 U.C.A. was expressly enacted for

the very purpose of providing the State of Utah with a right to
reimbursement.
plainer:

The language of the statute could not' be any

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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" — for the purpose of securing reimbursement
and of obtaining countinuing support..."
(Emphasis added).
Respondents next argue on Page 14 of their brief
"that 'reimbursement1, as used in §78-45-9, U.C.A. means
reimbursement of support, not reimbursement of necessaries
furnished by a third party."

Appellants submit that this is

indeed a subtle distinction.

Traditionally "support" has been

'

i

used in family law to mean providing necessities, whereas alimony
has always been variable based on many factors.

The instant
i

cases deal with support, and reimbursement for support under
statutory duties to the children and wives before the divorce.
Respondent's authorities dealing with alimony do not apply.
Respondents on Page 15 of their brief cite numerous
authorities pertaining to divorce and divorce modification to
support Respondent's position that §78-45-7 should be used to
determine retroactive amounts due in reimbursement cases.

These

i

authorities merely cloud and confuse the real issue, rather than
explicate the statute in question.

We are not dealirjxj with
i

divorce cases here.

The support obligations provided for in

§78-45-1 et. seq. are not alimony and child support declared
pursuant to a divorce decree.

There is no sum certain as per a

divorce decree, to modify an overdue installment.

Rather, the

statute imposes a statutory obligation to support wives and
children.

Failure to do so provides the State of Utah with an

action for reimbursement for the support it was forced to render.
Respondents attempt to distinguish in Los Angeles vs.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain(1942),
errors.
Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d 634,
122 P.2d
526

the statutes

in question as "quite different from the UCLSA."

This is a

matter of degree for the court to decide. Appellants will
only note that for statutes that are "quite different", they
are strikingly similiar in purpose and intent.

The Frisbie case,

id, statute is further attacked by Respondents:

That it

"clearly and unequivocally states that the obligor shall reimburse
the county, a far cry from §78-45-9's conferring of a right to
seek reimbursement."

Appellants

fail to see the seemingly

great distinction between the statutes involved.

Respondents

merely assert such differences exist but do not point them out.
In essence, they argue their conclusion.

Respondents further use

the same tactic in summarily dismissing Longevin v. Hillsborough
County, 320 A.2d 635, where the distinction appears to be a
"direct right (New Hampshire) vs. a subrogated right (Utah)."
Such a distinction seems miniscule.

Respondents cite Restatement

of the Law of Restitution-Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts,
which has no bearing on the instant case.

They then argue that

the State of Utah has an "affirmative duty to provide assistance
to 'persons in need1, [and therefore] cannot be deemed to be
acting 'unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor1 within
the meaning of the Restatement of Restitution, supra."
First of all, the persons with the affirmative duty
to support "persons in need", i.e. obligees, are the obligors,
not the State of Utah.

The very intent of §78-45-1 et. seq.

is to protect the State of Utah from incurring such a support
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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burden.

Secondly, the issue here is not how the State of

Utah's conduct measures up according to the language in the
Restatement of the Law of Restitution.

Rather, the issue is

the meaning of the statutory language found in §78-45-9 U.C.A.
Respondent's last two sentences on Page 19 of their
brief, without any support, authority, or even logic, state that since
the obligees in the instant cases did not furnish their own support,
the State of Utah has no independent third party right to
reimbursement.

Such an interpretation of §78-45-9 U.C.A. is a total

misreading of the statute.

If the obligees had in fact furnished

the support, the State of Utah would not have been required to do
so and thus would not be involved at all. More importantly,
Respondents would have the Court believe that the obligees have
a right to enforce the duty of support against the obligor only
when the obligees themselves have provided such support.
is not the intent, purpose or meaning of the UCLSA.

This

As indicated

by Appellants arguments, the general purpose of this entire area
of Utah law is to provide means whereby collection of delinquent
support is made easier.

U.C.A. §78-45-13 requires interpretation

to effectuate and implement those procedures.

Thus, the obligee

need not furnish his own support before enforcing that right
against an obligor.

Likewise, §78-45-9 states:

"Whenever the State department of public
welfare furnishes support to an obligee,
it has the same right as the obligee to whom
the support was furnished for the purpose of
securing reimbursement..."
(Emphasis added).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the State of Utah by subrogation has the same statutory right.
Any different reading of the above statute than that here
expressed strains the meaning of it and renders an improper
construction.
Respondents1 conclusion indicating that a separate
hearing need be held prior to the State of Utah filing an action
against them, is misleading.

The law suit as here involved

contains all the elements necessary for the hearing.

Otherwise,

Respondents are seeking two separate hearings to determine the
same thing.

At trial or in discovery, the Respondents have the

opportunity to present their defenses, if any, and at that time,
the Court makes a determination of the amount owing for back
support as well as establishing prospective support orders.
Contrary to what the Respondents claim, the burden of Utah taxpayers
would be greatly increased instead of reduced if the district court
was sustained.

CONCLUSION
Appellants submit this reply brief for the purpose of
clarifying issues Appellants feel have been intentionally
confused by Respondents.

Baggs vs. Anderson, Utah 2d, 53 8 P.2d

141 (1974), as well as Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9 permit the
State of Utah to prevail in this action and therefore Appellant
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requests this court to reverse the decision of the Weber
County District Court.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
FRANK V. NELSON
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorneys General

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

